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France’s Organisme de Défense et de Gestion: A Model
for Farmer Collective Action through Standard
Development and Brand Management
Christopher J. Bardenhagen*, Philip H. Howard** & MarieOdile Nozières-Petit***
Abstract****
Quality-based food production, often with a regional
dimension, can provide farmers with new, value-added markets. It
can also provide consumers with access to place-based high-quality
products, and may benefit local economies through increased
commerce. French Organismes de Défense et de Gestion (ODGs)
illustrate a mode of quality-based agri-food business organization.
ODGs focus on the development of production standards, as well as
management of the intellectual property related to those standards.
This mode, which is commonly used in Europe, has not often been
used in the United States, despite its potential for regional food
system development. The ODG mode may provide certain
advantages, such as the ability to assemble farmers and value chain
actors in a collective food product branding effort, while also
remaining in compliance with anti-trust laws —an ODG does not
actually buy or sell the products it certifies. Here we describe French
ODGs, their legal requirements, and their institutional supports and
development processes. We compare relevant French corporate law
to that of the United States, using Michigan as an example, and
describe how the ODG mode can be organized using existing state
statutes, provided steps are taken to ensure compliance with anti-trust
laws. We discuss how certain French institutional supports can be
*
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replicated by adding specific provisions to organizational
documents, and how others can be replicated by utilizing private
institutional structures, such as a nonprofit umbrella brand. Finally,
we discuss the circumstances for which the ODG mode could fit
well, and conversely describe specific situations where an ODG may
be less ideal. The ODG model has significant potential for branding
of value-added farm and food products, but as with any mode of
organization or business entity, it is not a panacea.

I. Introduction
Quality-based food production may bring a number of
benefits to farmers and consumers alike. Farmers may develop
alternatives to commodity markets by focusing on qualities that
consumers are increasingly seeking out at a wide variety of levels.1
One type of quality arises from using particular plant or genetic
varieties that have a specific flavor.2 Another type relates to products
grown or raised in particular ways, such as pastured poultry or grassfed beef, which speak to growing consumer interests in animal
welfare, omega-3 nutritional profiles, and environmental concerns.3
Depending on the product, these may be marketed at the
local, regional, or global level, with information about the product
often communicated through food labeling.4 There are many placeSee generally Aimé L. Aumaître, Quality and Safety of Animal Products, 59
LIVESTOCK PROD. SCI. 113, 113-24 (1999); Catherine Mariojouls, Introduction to
Quality: Quality Concepts, Quality Perception by Producers, Clients and
Consumers; Quality Signs (Geographic Origin, Ecolabelling, etc.); Translation of
Quality Concepts into Products, Procedures and Services, 51 CAHIERS OPTIONS
MÉDITERRANÉENNES 15, 15-22 (2000); Bertil Sylvander et al., Establishing a
Quality Convention, Certifying and Promoting the Quality of Animal Products:
The Case of Beef, in LIVESTOCK FARMING SYSTEMS: PRODUCT QUALITY BASED ON
LOCAL RESOURCES LEADING TO IMPROVED SUSTAINABILITY 61, 61 (2006).
2 See, e.g., François Casabianca & Claude Beranger, Le Lien au terroir des
viandes: Une construction originale [The Link to the Meat Terroir: An Original
Construction], in UNE HISTOIRE DES VINS ET DES PRODUITS D’AOC : L’INAO DE
1935 À NOS JOURS 147 (2015) (Fr.) (discussing localized production and genetic
factors leading to quality differences).
3 See, e.g., Kevin Romig, Impetus for Grass–Fed Beef Production in the Beef Belt,
103 GEOGRAPHICAL REV., 112, 112-20 (2013); Philip H. Howard & Patricia Allen,
Beyond Organic and Fair Trade? An Analysis of Ecolabel Preferences in the
United States, 75 RURAL SOCIO. 244, 244-69 (2010); Imen Oueslati et al., Virgin
Olive Oil (VOO) Production in Tunisia: The Commercial Potential of the Major
Olive Varieties from the Arid Tataouine Zone, 112 FOOD CHEMISTRY 733, 733-41
(2009).
4 See generally Jean-Christophe Bureau & Egizio Valceschini, European FoodLabeling Policy: Successes and Limitations, 34 J. FOOD DISTRIB. RSCH., Nov.
2003, at 70, 70-76; Danielle Ufer et al., Information and Consumer Demand for
Milk Attributes: Are Redundant Labels an Effective Marketing Strategy?, APPLIED
ECON. PERSP. POL’Y, 1, 1-2 (2021).
1
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based foods that have a particular quality due to the localization of
their production, marked by the use of local genetic material and/or
traditional know-how. Geographical Indications (GIs), for example,
establish an association and connection between the quality of the
products and a region, such as with Champagne wine, Idaho
Potatoes, and Roquefort Cheese.5 The production for each of these
quality types usually arises from local-based efforts (at different
scales: micro regional, regional or national), in contrast to
commodities which may be aggregated from many points around the
world. Quality-based food production may increase choice and
availability of healthy food options for consumers.6 It may also
provide farmers with a larger share of the food dollar, either through
shorter supply chains or value-added premiums,7 thereby
contributing to the agricultural economy (rural and urban) through
food business development.8
In Europe, farmers have developed multitudes of products
that incorporate production standards with the intellectual property
associated with quality signs. While not exclusive to Europe, quality
signs have been promoted at the European Union (EU) level for
decades as a strategy for rural development and one means of
cultivating and protecting the agricultural sector.9 Groups of farmers
can use quality signs as a method for creating added value and
increased sales through developing reputation. Quality signs can be

5

Luke Owen et al., Place-Based Pathways to Sustainability: Exploring Alignment
between Geographical Indications and the Concept of Agroecology Territories in
Wales,. SUSTAINABILITY (June 15, 2020), https://www.mdpi.com/20711050/12/12/4890/htm. See also M. Julien Frayssignes, L'ancrage territorial d'une
filière fromagère d'AOC. L'exemple du système Roquefort [The Territorial
Anchoring of an AOC Cheese Sector: The Example of the Roquefort System],. 264
ÉCONOMIE RURALE 89, 90 (2001) (evaluating the relationship of Roquefort cheese
production to its territory over time).
6 See Micaela Fischer et al., Food Hubs: Definitions, 10 Expectations, and
Realities. J. HUNGER & ENV’T NUTRITION 92, 93-94 (2015).
7 See, e.g., Marko Nousiainen et al., Are Alternative Food Systems Socially
Sustainable? A Case Study from Finland, 33 J. SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. 566, 581-82
(2009).
8 See Henk Renting et al., Understanding Alternative Food Networks: Exploring
the Role of Short Food Supply Chains in Rural Development, 35 ENV’T & PLAN. A:
ECON. & SPACE 393, 392-95 (2003).
9 Council Regulation 2081/92, art. 2, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, 2-3 (EC) (repealed by
Council Regulation 510/2006, O.J. (L 93) 12, 12-13 (EC), and further repealed by
Regulation 1151/2012 O.J. (L 343) 1, 1-2 (EU)).
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an effective means of protecting against dilution of quality or cooptation by the larger industry.10
A variety of types or modes of organization are used to
develop quality-based food production at the regional level in the
United States. These include farmers markets, community supported
agriculture arrangements, food hubs, cooperatives and other social
entrepreneurship-focused business entities, standard business
entities, and other governance modes such as state or federal
marketing orders. Due to the many complexities to local and regional
food system development, it is important for legal practitioners and
other business advisors to identify the best mode to fit a particular
effort that will match the specific needs of farmers and other actors
involved.
Particular methods of business organization are often shared
by practitioners across states or countries through research and
networking. For example, the Limited Liability Company (LLC)
form was created by legislation in Wyoming in 197711 and provides
multiple benefits over traditional corporations, such as pass-through
taxation and a high degree of organizational flexibility. LLC
legislation was later adopted by the other states, and now LLCs are
one of the most frequently used forms used to start a business,12 due
to their value for small business development. Although the specifics
of using a particular method or mode of organization will vary from
one legal system to another, the underlying purposes can usually be
translated to other contexts. France has adopted a similar form called
the Société à responsibilité limité (SARL).13 New forms and methods
of organization in many cases require enabling legislation to be
passed, such as with the LLC. However, some new forms and
10

See Lawrence Busch, Is Resistance Futile? How Global Agri-Food Attempts to
Co-opt the Alternatives, in RESISTANCE TO THE NEOLIBERAL AGRI-FOOD REGIME: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 21, 21-22 (Alessandro Bonnano & S. A. Wolf eds., 2018).
11 Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§17-15107(a)(viii)-(ix), 17-15-113, 17-15-122 (Westlaw through 2021 General Session of
Wyoming Legis.) (repealed 2010). See also Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited
Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS LAW. 375, 383 (1992).
12 For example, in Michigan during January 2021, 12,148 new LLCs were created
versus 1,080 new corporate entities. FY 2020/2021 New Corporation and Limited
Liability Company Monthly Totals, MICH. DEP’T OF LICENSING & REGUL. AFFS.,
HTTPS://WWW.MICHIGAN.GOV/LARA/0,4601,7-154-89334_61343_35413-544867-,00.HTML (last visited Sept. 23, 2021). Total number of Michigan domestic LLCs
in good standing as of October 1, 2020 is 623,400, versus 159,799 for-profit
corporations. Total Business Entities as of October 2020, MICH. DEP’T OF
LICENSING & REGUL. AFFS., (Oct. 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7154-89334_61343_35413-114907--,00.html.
13 See Code de Commerce [C. com.] [Commercial Code] arts. L. 223-1–223-43, R.
223-1–223-36 (Fr.).
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methods of organization can be utilized in a specific jurisdiction
using its existing laws.14
EU regulations require applicants seeking to use a quality
sign to be a “group” made up of “mainly producers.”15 This group
must develop production rules called “specifications,” oversee
production controls, and manage the defense of the sign.16 However,
these groups do not actually commercialize the products—their
members do. Countries within the EU can have additional
requirements for these collective management organizations.
France is the birthplace of quality signs from both an
intellectual property and an institutional programming perspective.17
Legislation to protect place-based quality products dates back to
1919,18 and several quality sign programs have been created since
then. The first official quality sign created in France was the famous
appellation d’origine contrôlée (AOC), which provided intellectual
property protection and brand labeling for products having a
connection to terroir, loosely translated as a “taste of the earth” or
the “taste of place” that a product was grown and produced.19
Another quality sign program France developed is the Label Rouge.
Started in 1965,20 Label Rouge is well-known by French
consumers.21 The Label Rouge is held as a certification mark by the
For examples, worker cooperatives can often be organized using a state’s
general cooperative statutes or even using other entities, depending on the state;
and benefit corporations can be created on an ad-hoc basis in Michigan due to the
specifics of Michigan corporate law. However, legislation creating a statutory
basis for a new form provides structure and legal clarity for practitioners and
regulators, which can lower the costs of organization for businesses.
15 Regulation No. 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
Nov. 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012
O.J. (L. 343) 8.
16 Id. at 9-12.
17 Scholarly articles describing GIs frequently provide introduction to French legal
history; for examples, see articles cited infra in notes 18, 19, and 24.
18 For a comprehensive legal history of French, European, and international
intellectual property related to place-based quality food products, see Lilian V.
Faulhaber, Cured Meat and Idaho Potatoes: A Comparative Analysis of European
and American Protection and Enforcement of Geographic Indications of
Foodstuffs, 11 COLUMBIA. J. EUR. L. 623 (2005).
19 See Elizabeth Barham, Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French
AOC Labeling, 19 J. RURAL STUD. 127, 131 (2003).
20 See generally Randall E. Westgren, Delivering Food Safety, Food Quality, and
Sustainable Production Practices: The Label Rouge Poultry System in France, 81
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1107, 1107-1111 (1999) (describing the origins and
characteristics of the Label Rouge program).
21 See Daniel Hassan & Sylvette Monier‐Dilhan, National Brands and Store
Brands: Competition Through Public Quality Labels, 22 AGRIBUSINESS, 21, 21-30
(2006).
14
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French Ministry of Agriculture, and permission to use it is granted to
applicants that can prove that their product is considered to be of
higher quality than the standard version of a product in consumer
taste tests and organoleptic lab testing.22 Label Rouge products are
marketed almost exclusively domestically, with many products
found only in certain French régions. The Label Rouge program is
unique to France and has not been replicated by other countries, but
it has been the subject of study by researchers in other countries.23
The French AOC program became the model for the EU’s
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and the Protected
Geographical Indication (PGI) programs created in 1992.24 The PGI
program requires a link between a product and the place it originates,
whereas qualification for the PDO program requires that all steps of
production, including processing and further transformation such as
cheese ripening, occur in the designated region.25
Each of the abovementioned official quality sign programs
serve as “umbrella” brands, and an institutional structure for
development and approval of products is provided by governments
both at the member state and the EU level. However, the quality
products themselves are managed within the private sector, by the
groups of farmers and other agricultural businesses involved in
production. Hence, in addition to the official quality sign logos, these
products are marketed under specific private brands.
Often referred to as quality groups, collective organizations
are used to manage quality sign projects. These quality groups must
comply with certain program regulations, which have experienced
22

See id. at 22; Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L641-1 (Fr.); Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime
Fisheries Code] art. R641-9 (Fr.).
23 See, e.g., Westgren, supra note 19, at 1110; Myra Clarisse Ferrer & Glenn C. W.
Ames, Food Quality Certification: Is the Label Rouge Program Applicable to the
U.S.?, 43 J. FOOD DISTRIB. RSCH., 114, 114-115 (2012).
24 24 Regulation 1151/2012 of the European Parliament of the Council of 21 Nov.
2012 on quality schemes for agriculture products and foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L 343)
1, 1-4. Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 of July 14, 1992 on the protection of
geographical indications and designations of origin agricultural products and
foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, 1-8 (repealed by Council Regulation (EC)
510/2006, and further repealed by Regulation (EU) 1151/2012). See also Delphine
Marie-Vivien et al., Are French Geographical Indications Losing Their Soul?
Analyzing Recent Developments in the Governance of the Link to the Origin in
France, 98 WORLD DEV. 25, 25-27 (2017).
25 Quality Schemes Explained, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/foodfarming-fisheries/food-safety-and-quality/certification/quality-labels/qualityschemes-explained_en (last visited Sept. 19, 2021). The European Commission
has a webpage dedicated to explaining these “quality schemes” available in
multiple languages. Id.
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changes over the years. Prior to the passing of European Standard
EN 45011 in 1998, quality groups could perform product controls
internally, certifying their own members to be able to use the quality
sign logo.26 However, EN 45011 required quality groups to use
independent organizations for certifying their members’ products.27
In France, this meant that groups managing Label Rouge and PGI
signs had to begin to work with third party control organizations
quickly, whereas the holders of the AOC/PDO sign were able to
continue to be overseen by a special department of the French
Ministry of Agriculture until 2006, after which each of the signs were
required to use control organizations for certification.28
A French ordinance passed in 2006 restructured the Institut
National de l’Origine et de la Qualité (INAO), making it the main
institutional support for each of the quality signs in France.29 Groups
seeking quality signs were then required to organize their collective
management body as an Organisme de Défense et de Gestion (ODG)
and to apply for use of a quality sign through the INAO.30
For reasons described in this paper, French ODGs represent
perhaps the most legally advanced, institutionally supported version
of collective management body used for the quality sign mode of
agri-food organization. Our comparative research addresses the
question of whether this mode can be readily replicated in the United
States, and furthermore, what additional mechanisms are needed to
meet the standards of the French ODG.

26

Christopher J. Bardenhagen, Qualitative Research Data Set Based on 42 SemiStructured Interviews (compiled January 2021) (unpublished data set) (on file with
author, available upon reasonable request). Interview data was coded and separated
into 5 thematic areas for analysis (summary 1, control mechanisms; summary 2,
defense, marketing supports, and other subsidies; summary 3, institutional support,
development, and oversight; summary 4, law and program regulations; summary 5,
missions and purposes of ODG.
27 Int’l Org. for Standardization, General Requirements for Bodies Operating
Product Certification Systems, Guide 65/1996 (April 16, 1998) (replaced more
recently by Guide 17065/2012).
28 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, summaries 1 and 4. See also Marie-Vivien et al.,
supra note 24, at 27.
29 Marie-Vivien et al., supra note 24, at 27. Loi 2006-1537 du 7 décembre 2006
relative au secteur de l’énergie [Law 2006-1547 of December 7, 2006 Relating to
the Energy Sector] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] Dec. 8, 2006, p. 180.
30 Loi 2006-1537 du 7 décembre 2006 relative au secteur de l’énergie [Law 20061547 of December 7, 2006 Relating to the Energy Sector] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] Dec. 8, 2006, p.
180. Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-17 (Fr.).
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In order to understand and consider the ODG mode and its
applications, this paper will proceed in three further sections. Chapter
II will describe the characteristics of ODGs—their function and
purpose, unique legal requirements, and the institutional support they
receive for development and oversight. Chapter III will compare the
method of organizing an ODG under French corporate law with that
of the United States to develop and manage a set of production
standards—more specifically, organizing an ODG in Michigan.31 For
this chapter, three levels of organization building will be considered:
a) meeting base minimum purposes and requirements b)
incorporation of certain aspects and benefits of the French model and
c) replication of a variety of institutional supports. Chapter IV will
explore the “organizational fit” for ODGs in the U.S.––under which
circumstances would the ODG mode be appropriate, and in which
situations would it not be a good fit?
A mixed methods approach was used for this research. Legal
research of French codified law, statutes, and regulation was
conducted. Among the resources used were statutory code books,
online code via Legifrance,32 European Commission information,33
programmatic informational documents, and INAO directives and
guides. Our description of ODGs structure and functioning is also
strongly informed by the perspectives gained from extensive
interviews conducted in France in 2018 and 2019 with farmers,
managers and value chain operators from 12 ODGs, government
staff and INAO outreach agents, consultants, and researchers (42
total interviews).34 We also reviewed the organizational documents
(statutes) from the 12 ODGs researched (note: the term “operators,”
which will be further defined below, refers to farmers and any other
value chain actors such as processors and packers whose actions are
implicated by any of the production rules of the quality sign).
II. Description of Organismes de Défense et de Gestion
Qualification as an ODG is a necessary step for collective
management organizations to utilize French quality signs programs,
and there are statutory requirements imposed on ODG structures. As
such, ODGs have many of the characteristics of a business entity (or
31

Michigan was chosen as the first author is a Michigan attorney and member of
the State Bar of Michigan.
32 See generally Codes, LÉGIFRANCE,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/liste/code?etatTexte=VIGUEUR&etatTexte=VIGU
EUR_DIFF (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
33 See generally EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
34 The aspects of this study involving human participants were reviewed and
approved by the Michigan State University Human Research Protection Program,
Exempt Category 2: MSU Study ID: STUDY00001089.
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quasi-entity). Here we provide information regarding the basic
functions and purposes of ODGs, their legal requirements,
development process and oversight.
A. Functions, Purposes, and Missions
As France’s chosen form for a collective management body,
the main function of ODGs is to develop and manage a quality sign
product or products.35 France’s very specific outlines for the
functioning of ODGs relate to the basic purposes of its quality sign
programs: rural development and farm viability (especially in remote
and rugged areas), enable equitable sharing of the profits within the
supply side of the value chain,36 and farm competitiveness in the
national and international marketplace.37 There are varying
requirements for each of the programs, but at the heart of each is the
purpose of providing consumers information about the quality of
products.38 As such, ODGs create production standards and promote
their brand, however, ODGs do not produce or sell the products
themselves—it is their farmer, cooperative, or processor members
who actually commercialize the products.39
The definition of quality also varies for each of the programs.
Quality for the Label Rouge program effectively means a better
sensory experience based on taste tests, whereas quality for the
AOP/PDO program is based on the “taste of place” or terroir, and
quality for the PGI program relates to the fact of being raised or
processed traditionally in a particular place.40 As stated by an INAO
35

See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L–642-22(Fr.). See also Bardenhagen, supra note 26, summaries 4 & 5.
36 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L–640-1 (Fr.). As one development researcher/practitioner stated, quality sign
organization is intended to be “…a type of bottom-up labelisation … that is
original because it is rooted in local elements, … it is up to the local group of
stakeholders to define the contents of the code of practice [specifications] …” See
Interview by French research group with anonymous researcher performed under
promise of confidentiality (April 2, 2019).
37 A national strategy of increased farmer adoption of or inclusion in quality sign
projects is being promoted under the current administration. There are some who
have concerns, however, that such a policy could lead to a watering down of
quality.
38 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L640-1(Fr.); Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L641-1− 641-13 (Fr.) (defining the details of the “signes d’identification
de la qualité et de l’origin,” the Label Rouge program’s focus on “qualité
supérieure,” and the AOC/PDO and PGI programs’ focus is on qualities that are
specifically connected to a place).
39 Bardenhagen, supra note 26.
40 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L–641-11(Fr.). See also Regulation 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of
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agent (translated from French), “It has to be a product that is
genuinely specific. You need to be careful: it doesn’t necessarily
have to be a quality product in the sense… how can I put this? It must
satisfy certain organoleptic specificities, but it’s not a product that
will please everyone.”41 While each quality sign product might not
be preferred by all consumers, one of the main public purposes
behind the programs is to efficiently transmit knowledge about these
high-information cost goods.42 For farmers and other operators of
ODGs, this leads to increased product reputation, which further
translates into new markets, increased sales, and/or higher prices.43
The statutory missions for ODGs are clearly defined in the
French Rural Code.44 These include development of the product
specifications, putting in place a control and inspection plan, and
defending and promoting the name of the product as intellectual
property45 (each of these are visited in more detail below). Also
included are requirements to communicate with the INAO for
oversight purposes, such as to transmit a current list of operators and
provide relevant budget information at INAO’s request.46 The
missions outlined in the Rural Code were normally included in the
ODG’s organizational documents.

the Council of Nov. 21, 2012 on the Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products
and Foodstuffs 2012 O.J. (L 343) 1; Barham, supra note 19.
41 Interview with anonymous regional agent performed under promise of
confidentiality, Institut National de l’orgine et de la qualité (Jan. 18, 2019).
42 See generally, Riccarda Moser et. al., Consumer Preferences for Fruit and
Vegetables with Credence-Based Attributes: A Review 14 INT’L FOOD &
AGRIBUSINESS MGMT REV. 121, 122, 126 (2011) (describing experiential goods as
those that can’t fully be evaluated before purchase, and credence products as those
that require trust in information provided, because consumers can’t fully determine
the nature of the good before or after the purchase (e.g., the attribute of
origin)); See also Interview with anonymous member of the Board of Directors
performed under promise of confidentiality, French ODG (Mar. 15, 2019)
(“There’s a real demand from society as a whole for us to explain how we work,”
(translated from French)).
43 As one small farm-market-oriented vegetable farmer described, “… it’s just the
same as being organically certified, you don’t have to justify yourself.” – Interview
with anonymous farmer member performed under promise of confidentiality,
French Organismes de Defense et de Gestion (June 17, 2019).
44 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-22(Fr.).
45 Id.
46Id. See also Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L642-23−642-25.
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i. Development of Production Specifications
Creating and managing product specifications form the core
of the ODG’s functions.47 Referred to as “cahier des charges” in
French, the “specifications” are the body of agreed upon production
rules for a particular product, describing all the steps needed for the
manufacture of the product, from the origin of the raw materials to
the packaging.48 The specifications become the intellectual property
of the ODG, and essentially are what are promoted, defended, and
controlled by the control plan.49 To meet its obligation, an ODG will
provide a space for communication and negotiation between the
farmers and other value chain operators. The more the product is
processed, the more downstream operators will be involved in the
process of developing the specifications.50 For the cases we studied,
many times the baseline of the specifications was simply the methods
that farmers were already using for production, as the main idea is to
include the practices and genetics that result in the typical product.
However, for AOP/PDOs and PGIs, delineation of the geographical
area is also part of the specification-building process, using criteria
which that might include micro-climates within a territory,
geological aspects, and cultural dimensions.51 While simple in
concept, the specifications can become quite complex, and ultimately
include requirements for sizing, shape conformation, packaging,
storage box sizes, and even sucrose (brix) levels.52

47

Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-22. See also Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 5.
48 Westgren, supra note 20, at 1108; see examples of cahier des charges for
different products by using the product search function, INSTITUT NATIONAL DE
L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, https://www.inao.gouv.fr (last visited Oct. 31,
2021).
49 Because the specifications form the rules of production that are advertised to
and/or largely accessible by consumers, they are the basis of branding and
reputational development.
50 Christopher J. Bardenhagen, Data Set Comprised of 12 Organizational Statutes,
Numerous cahiers des charges and Control Plan (2018-2019) (on file with author).
Information obtained upon condition of confidentiality.
51 Id. See also Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L641-6 (Fr.); Council Regulation 1151/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 343) 1-2, 8-9
(EU); Bardenhagen, supra note 26.
52 Bardenhagen, supra note 50. Our qualitative research indicates that ODGs are
increasingly adding specifications related to sustainability and environment, in
order to boost reputation with consumers. However, some practitioners advise to
keep the specifications focused on the production methods and situations that make
the product unique.
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ii. Control Mechanisms
Once the specifications are drafted, the control plan (“plan
de contrôle”) can be created.53 The control plan is based on the
important points of the specifications. It is the basis of verification
that a product is actually produced in line with the rules—enabling a
consumer to trust that a product is what the label says it is. The types
of items controlled for vary by product type and the particulars of the
specifications. They can include checking the documentation of
harvest dates, confirmation of appropriate storage and drying
facilities, and visual inspection of plant and animal variety, such as
the breed of cattle used for milk production for cheese products.54
Other control points include amount of pasture per animal and the
density of trees per acre to stay within agreed-upon limits.55
There are several levels of control: self-control by the
operators, consisting of checks and form filling; internal control by
the ODG, which conducts control checks on operators and audits
operators’ self-control forms; and external control by a third-party
control organization (CO), which conducts control checks of
operators in the field, and audits the ODGs’ control regularly (two to
four times a year).56 This inclusion of an independent third-party
controller to help draft the control plan and provide inspection
services is required by the Rural Code.57 The CO will perform both
planned and surprise visits along the value chain in order to help
ensure compliance with the specification.
The INAO mandates a minimum amount of external control,
the level of which can vary by sector.58 However, the remainder of
controls can be split between the ODG and the CO in a manner that
fits a group’s particular circumstances.59 A greater amount of internal
control will minimize external control needs; this enables those
ODGs that have the capacity and resources to manage a larger part
of the control, while allowing other ODGs to delegate certain tasks
53

Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-2 (Fr.). An overview of the principle or most notable control points will also
be listed in the specifications documents (cahier des charges). Id.
54 Bardenhagen, supra note 26; Bardenhagen, supra note 50.
55 Bardenhagen, supra note 26; Bardenhagen, supra note 50.
56 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1.
57 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-27−L642-35 (Fr.). Additionally, the CO must be approved and overseen by
INAO per Code Rural L642-34 and R642-41, and all third party-certification
organizations in France are overseen and approved by the Comité Français
d’Accréditation (COFRAC). Id. L642-34, R642-41.
58 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1.
59 Id.
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to the third-party CO. The ODG’s proposed split of control duties
must be approved by the INAO.60 As an example, one ODG controls
30% of its operators each year, with the CO inspecting 10%. The
ODG and CO coordinate to make sure they control different
operators in a particular year, and that each operator is inspected
relatively frequently.
The control plan also outlines what will be done in the case
of non-conformity. There are three levels of non-conformity: minor,
major, and severe (“grave”).61 Each has different consequences for a
particular control point that must be answered by the operator in a
different length of time (24 hours for severe, 1 week for major,
etc.).62 For example, harvesting the crop before specified dates might
be a minor charge where a warning is given, whereas utilizing an
unauthorized variety would be a severe issue that, if repeated, could
lead to suspension of the use of the ODG’s brand for the farmer.
Normally, ODG managers and the CO will work to help an operator
come back into compliance with the specifications.63 Sanctions can
include excluding the operator from use of the ODG’s branding label,
but this is rare and nearly always the result of inaction on the
operator’s part.64
The costs of third-party certification are usually covered by
the ODG, but charged to operators via annual fees (“cotisations”) in
order to spread the costs evenly over time, though in some groups the
individual operators pay the CO directly when they are controlled.65
iii. Defense of Intellectual Property and Brand Management
As the name implies, one of the main purposes for the ODG
as a collective management organization is to defend the quality sign
against fraud and usurpation.66 Fraudulent use of the sign can occur
at two levels—the local/regional level and the larger national or
international commerce level. Locally, fraud tends to happen in the
form of individual farmers who are not part of the ODG marketing
their products using the quality sign name brand or logo, often at
farmer’s markets, local shops, or at roadside stands. Most ODGs that
60

Id.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at Summary 1.
64 Id; Bardenhagen, supra note 50. Note that the control organizations do not
inspect for food safety compliance; it is only for the specification points. However,
COs are obliged to report serious food safety issues if they see them.
65 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1; Bardenhagen supra note 50.
66 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-22 (Fr.); Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 5.
61
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we interviewed have these issues with some frequency,67 and
managers will talk to the farmer or send a cease-and-desist letter.
Usually such action is sufficient, but if not, ODGs can get the INAO
involved, or even file an action at the local court.
At the extra-regional or foreign level, the positive reputation
that an ODG develops can lead outside businesses to infringe on the
name. When this occurs, ODGs can work with INAO and the French
consumer fraud authority, DGCCRF,68 which can provide assistance
and legal support.69 Most ODGs do not get involved with litigation
frequently, but when it does occur INAO provides substantial
support, including sharing the costs of legal services.70
ODGs carry out a variety of promotional activities for the
quality sign, with some being more involved with marketing and
promotion efforts than others. ODGs promote their quality sign
brand in a general way, rather than particular products of their
individual members.71 Managers often attend regional food fairs and
salons where they can educate people about their production
practices and hand out promotional materials. Some ODGs are
involved with agri-tourism, setting up farm visit days with maps of
farmer stops on a trail or around a region, as well as supermarket
promotions, usually within the relevant farming region.72 However,
some of the larger volume ODGs have initiated media campaigns,
67

Ideally, all the farmers in a particular region will eventually begin to produce
under the specifications and become official members of the ODG, especially with
the regionally-oriented AOP/PDO and PGI programs. This 100% saturation can
happen as an ODG develops its reputation, gains sales, and adds producers over
time.
68 Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Repression
des Frauds, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf (last visited Sept. 20, 2021).
69 See Id.; INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ (INAO),
https://www.inao.gouv.fr (last visited Sept. 20, 2021). The INAO has authority to
take action/litigate based on France’s intellectual property code (Code de la
Propriété Intellectuelle) whereas the DGCCRF takes action based on the consumer
code (Code de la Consommation). See Code de la propriété intellectuelle
[Intellectual Property Code] art. L711-1−L731-4 (Fr.); Code de la consommation
[Consumer Code] art. L511-1−L541-3 (Fr.).
70 As stated by an INAO agent (translated from French): “If we observe that
someone is doing this, we can… not necessarily take them to court straight away,
it generally starts with official letters, but it can end up in court if there’s no other
way of finding a solution. In that case, we have lawyers who support the ODG.
And the cost – because lawyers aren’t free! – is shared between the ODG and the
INAO.” – Interview with anonymous regional agent performed under promise of
confidentiality, Institut National de L’orgine et de la Qualité (Jan. 18, 2019).
71 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summaries 2 and 4. ODGs do not buy, sell, or
otherwise commercialize quality sign products themselves; more on this in the
“Legal Requirements” section below.
72 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 2.
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such as advertisements in the Paris Metro.73 ODGs often receive
subsidies from the EU or regional French authorities in order to
promote their products, sometimes in collaboration with businesses
that do the direct marketing of the products.74
B. Legal Requirements
The definition and main legal requirements for quality sign
programs and ODGs are outlined in Book Six, Title IV of the French
Rural code.75 However, multiple areas of the law apply to ODG
functioning, in particular French corporate and nonprofit law, and the
French Intellectual Property code related to trademarks and
geographical indications.76 This subsection B will focus on the
specific laws and regulations that help to shape and define ODGs.77
i. Entity Considerations and Membership Definitions
A very important aspect of ODGs is that they must not have
a commercial purpose, meaning that they do not buy, sell, or
themselves produce the goods they manage.78 Because of this, only
certain forms of business entities are permitted for organizing an
ODG,79 namely, “syndicates”80 (farmer’s unions), or associations
73

Id.
Id.
75 See generally Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L640-1−L644-15, R641-1− D646-37 (Fr.) (“La valorization des
produits agricoles, forestiers ou alimentaires et des produits de la mer.”).
76 Trademark laws are similar in France and the U.S., but geographical indications
have a separate legal regime in France, found in the CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ
INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L721-1−L722-17, R7211−R. 722-7.
77 Many of the main requirements for ODGs are spelled out in Chapter II, Section
III of Title IV (Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L642-17−L. 642-26, R642-33−R642-36), titled Les organismes de
défense et de gestion [Defense and Management Organizations].
78 Bardenhagen, supra note 26. This admonition against commercial purpose,
while not found in French codes or accessible regulations, is detailed in the
INAO’s guidance publication for ODGs. INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE
LA QUALITÉ, GUIDE DU DEMANDEUR POUR LA
RECONNAISSANCE EN QUALITÉ DE DÉFENSE ET DE GESTATION [APPLICANT’S GUIDE
FOR RECOGNITION AS A DEFENSE AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION] 16 (2017). It
was also mentioned and emphasized by multiple INAO agents and other
interviewees officially connected to the INAO. For this reason, it is either a de
facto regulation, or, we hypothesize, a per se regulation codified in an INAO
Circulaire, which are not publicly accessible.
79 See id.
80 Syndicates are organized under the French labor code. Code du travail [C. trav.]
[Labor Code] art. L2131-1−L2131-6. Code du travail art. R2131-1 requires a
syndicate to file their statutes at the local Mayor’s office.
74
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organized under the Loi du 1er juillet 1901,81 the main nonprofit law
used in France.82 For-profit corporations and cooperatives are
prohibited from use due to their commercial nature, though certain
“interprofessions” organized prior to 2007 can be approved to act as
ODGs, provided they split their ODG missions and finances from
their other activities.83 While a baseline business entity must be used
to organize an ODG, we posit that the ODG form can be considered
as a “quasi”-business entity due to the statutory and regulatory
requirements that apply to the form. ODGs can manage more than
one quality product,84 for example a poultry ODG might manage
different quality signs for the chicken, duck, and eggs that its farmers
raise.
The flexible, if complicated, French legal platform for ODGs
gives all the relevant value chain actors implicated by the production
rules the power to get involved. ODGs can involve farmers, packers,
processors, slaughterhouses, and potentially other upstream and
downstream actors, collectively defined as “operators.” The Rural
Code, in seeking to ensure that all relevant producers have a voice in
decision-making about the production rules, define an operator as
“… each person that actually participates in the activities of
production, transformation, processing, or packing planned for in the
production specifications …”85 In other words, any actor who is
involved in a production step outlined by the production rules is an
operator and has certain rights and obligations under the Rural Code.
Operators are deemed to be members of the ODG as a matter
of law,86 but membership in the underlying entity – the association
or syndicate – can be further defined in their organizational
81

This association law is an important standalone law that has not been
incorporated into one of the French statutory codebooks but is instead regulated by
the law of contracts. Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’assocation [Law
of July 1, 1901 relating to the Association Contract] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 2, 1901, p.
1. Associations must file their statutes at the local Prefecture, found at the head of
the department (akin to a county seat in the United States; there are 101
departments in France). Id. Statutes are publicly available by request, but not
online.
82 However, ODGs are not charitable organizations.
83 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-19 (Fr.).
84 Id. art. L642-17.
85 Id. art. L642-3. Similar to Michigan state law, “persons” can include
corporations and other legal entities under French law. See e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 450.2108 (Westlaw through P.A. 2021, No. 81, of the 2021 Reg. Sess.,
101st Legis.).
86 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-21 (Fr.).
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documents, following laws applicable to that entity.87 Operators can
be represented by delegates, provided there is some democratic
mechanism for selection of delegates and that the operators are kept
informed about ODG matters.88 In some ODGs, for example,
cooperatives are the main members, but this is acceptable because
the farmer operators are involved in the democratic processes at the
cooperative level.89 However, ODGs must provide a means for
individual operators to become part of the ODG, for example farmers
that are not members of a member cooperative.90
ii. Financing
Regarding financing, an ODG is free to determine how to
calculate a fee structure for the funding of its activities.91 Sometimes
these fees (cotisations) will be flat, but they are often calculated on a
per-unit basis. The decision to set fee levels must be decided on
annually by the General Assembly, which is the whole body of the
members, and the details of this vote must be provided to the INAO.92
This provides the operators a direct vote on the fees as a matter of
law, ensuring a small board of directors cannot control the financial
decisions affecting all the operators. Operators are obligated to
provide the information necessary to calculate their fees to the
ODG,93 though in some situations not all operators in an ODG are
necessarily liable to pay the fees, for example where a cooperative
pays on a farmer’s behalf.
iii. Organizational Documents and Structural Requirements
The basic fee structure, details on membership, and missions
are all set forth in the ODGs “statutes” and “règlement intérieur,”
which are organizational documents similar to corporate articles of
incorporation and bylaws in the United States.94 In order to apply for
87

For example, the groups statutes might require the annual fees to be paid as a
condition or confirmation of membership.
88 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78, at 8.
88 See id.
89 See Bardenhagen, supra note 26; Bardenhagen supra note 50.
90 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITE, supra note 78, at 8.
91 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-24 (Fr.).
92 Id. See id. art. L642-25.
93 See id. art. L642-24.
94 An organization’s statutes contain many of the operational rules concerning
membership and the board of directors inter alia, that would be contained in
bylaws in the U.S. However, while bylaws in the U.S. are a private document, the
statutes are a semi-public document, accessible by the general public, but only
upon request (not held online like articles of incorporation can be in the U.S.). As
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recognition as an ODG, the group must provide their statutes (and
règlement intérieur if they have one) to the INAO for approval.95
Groups have a high degree of flexibility with how to structure the
ODG, but among other things, INAO checks to see if the relationship
between the operators passes scrutiny regarding three statutory and
regulatory factors:
•
•
•

representativeness of the operators (représentativité des
opérateurs)96
democratic functioning (fonctionnement démocratique)97
balanced representation (représentation équilibrée)98

These factors, detailed below, broadly seek to implement
fairness, which is a concept that is perhaps uniquely operationalized
in various areas of French law including contracts.99 Overall,
deference is given to the group organizing the ODG, but INAO
outreach agents and National Committee members100 check to ensure
that the power relationship between actors is not too out of balance.
Representativeness of the operators. The factor of
representativeness of operators relates to the basic rule that all
operators potentially implicated by the ODG’s product specifications
such, the statutes are somewhat of a cross between articles and bylaws. The
règlement intérieur is a private document, however, which can add more specifics
and rules to the statutes but cannot contradict the statutes on any matters. A
règlement intérieur is optional – many ODGs do not have one. See Guides
Pratiques [Practical Guides], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ,
https://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/Espace-professionnel-et-outils/Produire-sous-signesde-qualite-comment-faire/Guides-pratiques (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
95 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-33 (Fr.).
96 See id. L642-18; INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, INAODJR-2009-03 RÉV. 1, SUIVI DES CONDITIONS DE RECONNAISSANCE ODG
[MONITORING OF ODG RECOGNITION CONDITIONS] (2011).
97 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 96.
98 Id.
99 See Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1171 (Fr.) (deeming certain sideclauses that create a “significant imbalance” between parties to be “unwritten”
(essentially non-enforceable)); Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1195 (Fr.)
(allowing a judge to revise a contract when unforeseen circumstances make it
onerously costly for a party to perform); Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art.
1221 (Fr.) (allowing specific performance unless it would be extraordinarily costly
to the obliged). Fairness is a concept incorporated into contract law in United
States as well, but the French mechanisms seem to provide stronger safeguards
against greatly disadvantageous outcomes.
100 The Rural Code creates several national committees to provide oversight of
quality sign programs and approve applications for ODG status. See Code rural et
de la pêche maritime [Rural Fisheries and Maritime Code] art. L642-6−L642-11
(Fr.).
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must have a voice.101 To assess this, INAO agents work to determine
how many operators are involved with the ODG relative to the total
number of operators currently working in the production of that
product, as well as the volume of product the group organizing the
ODG produces relative to the whole.102 For example, the organizers
of an ODG for a GI identifying a particular variety of pears should
make sure that at least 80% of the growers of that variety in that
region are represented and involved in the discussions, and similarly
that most of the volume of production is represented. In this way, an
ODG should mirror fairly closely the extant industry, so that the
ODG does not become an exclusive club.103 As intellectual property,
the quality sign becomes a common good among the producers and
operators involved, and therefore an ODG should not be created in
such a way as to allow one or more firms to monopolize it.104 In a
practical sense, this does not mean all operators will participate in
the ODGs production rules from the start. Often the membership
grows once the ODG is more established and the operators involved
experience more benefits, with some PGI and PDO ODGs eventually
adding all the farmers from the region onto its membership list.
Some scholars, however, question the value of
representativeness, noting that this requirement can duplicate
already-existing inequalities or unfair situations between ODG
actors.105 For example, a group of smaller cheese producers might
seek a quality sign for their products that requires the use of certain
artisanal practices, but representativeness enables larger companies
of cheese in their area to enter the ODG and water down the rules. In
101

See, e.g., id. art. L642-18. The rules, regulations, and practice surrounding
ODG development provide multiple layers of assurance that any of the farmers and
other value chain operators involved in production can have a place in the
development of the ODG and the production rules, even if through another
democratic entity such as a cooperative.
102 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78.
103 In the case of GIs, a delineated region is created, and all growers inside that
region are implicated. However, the rules of Label Rouge allow for farmers or
other food producers to create a product that is different from the standard, without
regional constriction and reputational history, and so some Label Rouge ODGs
illustrate exceptions to this rule. For example, several producers of a new, special
variety of wheat could work together, potentially span different regions, provided
they create a collective (ODG) that enables other producers that comply with the
product specifications to join.
104 For further reading related to the concept of common ownership, see Stéphane
Fournier et al., Les indications géographiques au regard de la théorie des
communs [Geographical Indications with Regard to the Theory of Commons],
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES ÉTUDES DU DEVELOPPEMENT 139, 141 (2018).
105 See Delpine Marie-Vivien et al., Controversies Around Geographical
Indications: Are Democracy and Representativeness the Solution?, 121 BRIT. FOOD
J. 2995, 3006 (2019).
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this way, the reputation that may have been built by artisanal
producers over many years can become exploited by processors
working with essentially commodity milk.
Democratic functioning. The factor of democratic
functioning requires there to be democratic processes underlying all
important decisions for the ODG. All operators must be able to have
a voice individually or to elect members through some democratic
mechanism.106 This means that even though farmers are operators in
an ODG, cooperatives can be per se members and vote in the General
Assembly because there is a method for electing the delegates
through the cooperative.
To create a democratic form, ODGs can organize different
classes of operators into colleges or sections.107 This enables the
different classes to have representation on the board of directors
(conseil), which provides flexible structuring that can fit nearly any
value chain situation and number of operators. Some ODGs may
have hundreds of farmers, multiple processors, and a college of
farmers that process on farm, whereas more simple ODGs have only
farmers as members. As such, the ODG model can allow for
significant complexity, as opposed to the cooperative form, which is
normally more limited to one member, one vote, and single levels of
membership, even for different product areas (though capital
contributions can vary). Democratic functioning in an ODG is not
limited to one member, one vote, and structures where the
downstream actors (e.g., processors, slaughterhouses) have as many
board seats as the upstream operators (e.g., farmers) are not
uncommon and are found to be acceptable by INAO.108
Relevant to the concept of democratic functioning, it is up to
the ODG to spell out the process of creating the product
specifications, and the body that is charged with developing it.109
Although the structure must be approved by INAO, which
presumably ensures that the voices of the operators are heard, in
some cases the main process of product rule creation can be
delegated to the board.110 While this surely adds practicality to the
development of the production rules, there is a risk of decisionmaking being skewed towards more concentrated actors, such as

106 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE
107 See id. at 13.
108

L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78.

Bardenhagen, supra note 50.

109 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra
110 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.

note 78, at 12.
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cooperatives and processors, even if those results are ratified at the
General Assembly of operators.
Balanced representation. The factor of balanced
representation relates to the different categories of the operators
along the value chain that are involved.111 While this factor is
ostensibly meant to ensure that farmers have significant voice, this
principle goes both ways, also requiring that there be representation
from the processors, packers, and other downstream operators. This
factor is closely tied to the representativeness and democratic
functioning of an ODG. What is considered to be balanced
representation can vary widely, again with deference usually given
to the ODG. INAO will step in when they determine there is a
significant imbalance or lopsidedness, such as a situation where a
small number of downstream operators hold a clear majority of the
decision-making power.112
C. Institutional Support and Oversight
Two significant areas of support for ODGs are related to
support during the application process, including applications for
changes to existing production rules, and to subsidies that help save
resources for ODGs.
i. Application Process and Continuing Oversight
The INAO is main supporting organization for ODG
development and ongoing changes with production specifications,
with approximately 21 INAO regional offices serving the different
French regions.113 Interested groups will come to these agents for
information and guidance on the process. Three important areas for
which INAO agents provide support and oversight are the
development of the ODG organizational structure, the development
or modification of specifications, and communications with the
INAO National Committee114 that ultimately decides on the ODGs
application.
The organizational structure is of first order importance
because it is the ODG that creates the specifications via a democratic
111See INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA
112 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.

QUALITÉ, supra note 78, at 12.

L’INAO sur le Territoire [INAO on the Territory], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE
L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, https://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/The-NationalInstitute-of-origin-and-quality-Institut-national-de-l-origine-et-de-la-qualiteINAO/L-INAO-sur-le-territoire (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
114 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-6–642-11 (Fr.) (establishing the INAO National Committee structure).
113
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process; therefore, it is important to ensure that the appropriate
stakeholders have a voice and a sufficient level of voting power in
the ODG. To accomplish this, when working with a new group INAO
will evaluate whether the appropriate stakeholders are involved in
the process, per the représentativité or representativeness factor
mentioned above. Usually, local agents already have familiarity with
the sector involved, but will also go to the local Chamber of
Agriculture to cross reference information given to them by the ODG
organizers regarding the volume of product and percentage of the
implicated operators they represent.115 To help institute the factors of
fonctionnement démocratique and représentation équilibrée, INAO
agents can provide advice to groups on the internal structure during
the development of their statutes,116 with some agents being more
involved in statute development than others. Groups are encouraged
to connect with existing ODGs to gather experience and examples of
statutes that can help them create their organizational structures.
Industry groups and cooperatives also help with statutes
development in some circumstances. Local INAO agents can send
difficult questions regarding the statutes or internal structure on to
the legal department at the central INAO office in Paris for an
opinion. Overall, INAO agents guide groups in creating a structure
that will pass the scrutiny of the INAO National Committee.
As the production rules or specifications are being written by
the ODG, a Commission of Inquiry is created from members selected
from the INAO National Committee.117 Both this commission and an
ODG’s local INAO agent will provide expertise on items that should
be included (or alternatively, excluded).118 They also will advise
groups to consider the corresponding control measure for any item
that will be included in the specifications, as control measures are
based on important points in the specifications. Both INAO agents
and members of Commission of Inquiry can ask for help from
university or government research units to provide assistance on an
ad hoc basis with writing specifications, such as with drafting a
comprehensive definition of the product.119 Additionally, agents
from control organizations (COs) will advise groups on
115

Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
As mentioned above, the statutes are similar to bylaws in the U.S., setting out
provisions for the governance structure for the organization (e.g., board
membership and voting rules). The statutes document is the main organizational
document for ODGs and many other corporate organizations.
117 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
118 Id.
119 Marie-Odile Nozières-Petit, Comment (June 3, 2021). Dr. Nozières-Petit is a
member on the Label Rouge/PGI National Committee, serving as a personalité
qualifié.
116
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specifications and items to consider for the control plan if they are
able to connect early on with an ODG.120
Where specifications involve defining areas of production,
as with PDOs and PGIs, INAO will provide experts to help delimit
and define the areas, including geographers.121 These definitions will
eventually become part of the specifications.
Once an ODG’s dossier is ready, it is sent to the appropriate
INAO National Committee, which oversees and approves
applications both for new quality signs and for modifications to an
existing quality sign’s specifications.122 The National Committee
structure is an important institutional pillar for the French quality
sign programs, providing a clear decision-making process for
recognition of products and oversight to ODGs.123 The appropriate
committee will look at the ODG’s statutes (and règlement intérieur
if the group has one) to ensure it complies with the Rural Code
requirements for structure.124 The committee will also review and
comment on the specifications or modification of the specifications.
The French fraud and consumer protection agency (DGCCRF) is part
of the committee process and can provide ODGs input on labelling
and other items on behalf of consumers.
The INAO agents and members of the Commission of
Inquiry serve as liaisons for ODGs at the National Committee
meetings.125 After helping a group to prepare their dossier for
committee approval, the local agent and the members of the
Commission of Inquiry will attend the meetings (held in Paris) in
order to explain the ODGs case, acting both as an advocate for the
ODG and as a communication messenger from the National
Committee to the ODG.126
The process of quality sign development can be quite long,
with final approval taking anywhere from two years, to longer than
a decade.127 It can take four or more years to make seemingly simple
modifications of the production rules.128 This is perhaps both a
120

Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1.
Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
122 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summaries 2 and 3; See Code rural et de la
pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-6 (Fr.)
123 For more about the National Committee structure, including details about the
composition of the subcommittee, see See Code rural et de la pêche maritime
[Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. R642-1–642-12 (Fr.).
124 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
121
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weakness and a strength of the quality sign programs—while
practical amendments related to technological advances require an
onerous process, consumers are essentially provided a higher
guarantee that the level of quality will not be eroded. INAO has a
policy to not approve any change in specifications that will have a
negative impact on the quality of the product, however it is debatable
whether this has been adhered to in certain cases.129
Once approved, local INAO agents will continue to work
with and provide oversight to ODGs. They are invited to the General
Assembly meetings, where they can confirm the voting process for
annual fees required by law.130 ODGs are required to annually submit
to the local INAO agents the minutes of the General Assembly
meetings and a current list of operators.131 Local agents are normally
in frequent communication with ODGs because they regularly seek
to make modifications to the production rules, including sometimes
minor changes, such as storage container size.
ii. Defense and Marketing Support and Other Subsidies
While there is little direct government aid for farmers to
adopt quality label production, ODGs and quality signs are supported
in a numerous ways. Common agricultural subsidies and farm aid
from the EU and France can help farmers to get started with quality
sign production, as with other types of production.132 In some cases
regional authorities help farmers in these systems, for example, to
make equipment purchases relevant to the region’s production.
Regional bodies, such as the Chamber of Agriculture, sometimes
provide office space and other office support for ODGs.133
Cooperatives often offer programs for new farmers, who might be
edged towards quality signs as viable avenues of production.
However, in most cases it seems to be the price premium or

129

For example, in one cheese group, the rules were changed to allow pasteurized
milk to be used to make the cheese, enabling much larger farmers to enter the
ODG and produce large volumes of cheese, but damaging the reputation of the
quality sign and putting downward pressure on quality. See Marie-Vivien et al.,
supra note 105, at 3001-02.
130 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
131 Id. See also Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code], art. L642-25.
132 See Commission Staff Working Document Evaluation of the Impact of the CAP
Measures on the General Objective ‘Viable Food Production,’ SWD (2021) 106
final (May 11, 2021). For example, the EU has subsidized 50% or more of the cost
of tree plantings in certain areas, and for certain varieties – but these are not
limited to quality sign varieties. See Commission Staff Working Document on the 3
Billion Tree Planting Pledge for 2030, SWD (2021) 651 final (July 16, 2021).
133 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
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reputational edge of quality signs that attracts farmers to work with
ODGs in their area.134
One of the most important areas of support at the level of the
ODG is assistance with defense. As mentioned above, ODGs can
write cease and desist letters to people inside and outside their region
based on the intellectual property they have been granted in the form
of a quality sign. However, when that isn’t effective, the ODG can
ask INAO to send a cease-and-desist letter, which is backed up by
threat of litigation—INAO will share the legal costs with groups.135
It would be impossible to quantify the value of having a government
agency backing up an ODG’s intellectual property, but in addition to
staff time and the sharing of lawyer’s fees that occur from time to
time in higher profile cases, many infringers are likely deterred by
INAO’s cease and desist letters at the outset.
Another area where ODGs garner a significant amount of
support is promotion. The EU regularly provides funding that can be
used for building reputation for an ODG’s products.136 The amounts
can represent a significant percentage of an ODG’s marketing budget
and provide money for advertisements, such as for national radio
spots. Regional authorities also provide substantial support to ODGs,
for promotion of the brand, as well as products associated with the
region.137
In closing this section, it should be emphasized that one of
the largest sources of support, which saves substantial ODG
resources, is the INAO itself. This institutional framework provides
groups a starting point and assistance that would normally have to be
undertaken by an entrepreneur, and in an ad-hoc manner, which
would likely be less efficient without tested models and processes to
adopt. Salient to the topic of marketing supports, INAO agents help
with development and oversight using programmatic rules that serve
to keep a high level of quality for the products. The umbrella nature
of the quality sign labels (Label Rouge, PGI, PDO/AOC) creates a
framework that significantly lowers the cost of developing reputation
for a group, because of the existing recognition and credibility of the
label.
134As

stated by one ODG manager (translated from French): “Objectively
speaking, it’s not the subsidies that incite farmers to produce. … What does
encourage them is the added value of having a Label Rouge [product] in relation to
standard production.” – Interview with Anonymous, Business Manager, French
Organisme de Défense et de Gestion (Jan. 29, 2019).
135 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 2.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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III. Legal Methods of Organization of the ODG Mode in
the United States
The central aspect of this model—the development of
production specifications and the management of resulting
intellectual property—can be accomplished using existing state-level
law. Here we use Michigan as an example state legal system and
statutory regime. However, there are several important aspects of the
French model that would require modifications or special provisions
to be put into the organizational documents. Furthermore, there are
many benefits stemming from the quality sign programs and other
French institutional supports that would require the development of
oversight mechanisms. This paper will visit each of these levels in
turn.
A. Establishing the Core Purpose of Development and
Management of Specifications
Creating an organization that replicated the core purpose of
the ODG model in the United States would be relatively simple.
However, additional steps need to be taken in order to ensure
compliance with anti-trust laws.
In Michigan, the most appropriate entity to use would be a
nonprofit association created under the Nonprofit Corporation Act.138
This act can be used to create a wide range of nonprofit businesses.139
By electing to use a non-stock membership structure, the group can
create an appropriate form based on the circumstances and the value
chain actors involved.140 The organization can be managed on a one
member, one vote basis, which is the default basis provided in the
law,141 or different classes of members can be given different voting
rights.142 This would allow for operators to be organized into
colleges, each of which has a defined level of representation on the
board of directors.

138

Nonprofit Corporation Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.2101-.3192 (Westlaw
through P.A.2021, No. 81, of the 2021 Reg. Sess., 101st Legis.).
139 These include nonprofit cooperatives. See id. § 450.2123(2)(a). However, due
to the commercial nature of the cooperative form, even a nonprofit cooperative
would not be appropriate for the ODG mode, particularly if value chain actors
other than farmers will be involved, due to antitrust concerns. See generally 26
U.S.C.A. § 501; see also 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 291-292.
140 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.2302 (Westlaw through P.A. 2021, No. 81, of the
2021 Reg. Sess., 101st Legis.1983); see generally id. § 450.2304.
141 Id. § 450.2304(3).
142 Id. § 450.2304(2).
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It is necessary to elaborate the basic purposes for the
organization in the articles of incorporation.143 While this statement
can be somewhat broad (e.g., “ …organized for the purpose of
branding agricultural products”), it may be prudent to narrow to the
main purposes of the ODG mode in order to help clarify the noncommercial nature of the organization: the purpose of the
organization is to create of production standards, develop of
intellectual property and branding, and promote and defend the
brand.144 While non-commercial, an ODG-mode business is not a
charitable organization and therefore would not quality as a 501(c)3
organization for federal income tax purposes.145
A nonprofit association that has value chain actors other than
farmers for members will not be exempt from anti-trust regulations
under the Capper-Volstead act,146 making it important to ensure that
members are not using the organization to engage in any sort of price
setting. Provisions should be included in the articles of incorporation
that prohibit real time price fixing or quantity coordination across
members. The bylaws should also have a provision that explicitly
prohibits discussions regarding prices or efforts to affect quantity at
all meetings of the organization. French ODGs similarly comply with
antitrust laws by not engaging in commercial activities, and by not
allowing members to use ODG meetings and venues to discuss
price.147
In regard to antitrust and competition law, however, it is
sometimes argued that certain production specifications can
ultimately affect quantity—directly or indirectly. A full analysis of
related French and EU anti-trust jurisprudence is outside of the scope
of this article,148 but production rules that provide direct constraints
143

See id. § 450.2202(b).
This suggestion is made both in keeping to the French ODG model and in
providing a safeguard against violation of anti-trust regulations.
145 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3). However, an ODG-mode business organized as a
Michigan nonprofit corporation might qualify as a 501(c)6 trade association. See
id. § 501(c)(6).
146 See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 291-292. An exception lies with organizations managing
federal and state marketing orders, which can include processors in addition to
farmers; they are exempt as a result of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937. See
id. § 608b(a).
147 Bardenhagen, supra note 26.
148 For more on this topic, see Emmanuel Raynaud & Egizio Valceschini, Collectif
ou Collusif? [Collective or Collusive?], 2 Revue Internationale de Droit
Économique 165, 195 (2005); Stéphan Marette & Emmanuel Raynaud,
Applications du Droit de la Concurrence au Secteur Agroalimentaire
[Applications of Competition Law to the Agri-Food Sector], 277 Économie Rurale
2, 3 (2003); Emannuel Raynaud & Egizio Valceschini, Competition Regulation
Against Quality Policy: The «Label Rouge» in the French Poultry Industry, in
144
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on quality, such as limiting the amount of acreage or limitations to
entry of new participants, can sometimes survive scrutiny in France
and the EU. However, such product specifications should be avoided
in the United States until/unless there is clear legislation and/or case
law enabling them to be used, or unless there is an applicable legal
exemption that a group is working under (for example, a federal
marketing order).149 Production rules that are established in order to
develop a particular quality of product, such as geographical origin,
varietal or genetic selection, or grading and uniformity rules, do not
directly limit quantity and should therefore be safe from an anti-trust
perspective.150 Similarly, production rules that focus on conservation
or other sustainable practices should be allowable, given that thirdparty certifications, ecolabels, and food safety rules are widely
adopted across farmers without issue, even if these rules have
(usually limited) indirect consequences on quantity. However, rules
that are ostensibly quality-oriented, but are actually a guise for
limiting quantity should not be used; the ODG mode would not
protect a group or industry from anti-trust actions in such a
situation.151
B. Incorporating Other Benefits Resulting from French law
An organization in the United States seeking to replicate the
multiple aspects of fairness prescribed in French law can do so by
adding specific provisions to their organizational documents. One of
the central tenets of the French quality sign programs is accessibility
to the ODG and the resulting brand.152 All farmers and other actors
that comply with the rules should be able to join the ODG, have some
level of voice in the decision-making, and utilize the brand or quality
TYPICAL AND TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS: RURAL EFFECT AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
PROBLEMS 529, 530 (F. Arfini & C. Mora, Eds., 1997).
149 Limitations to acreage have been used as a cause of action in the United States.
See John C. Monica, Jr., Agricultural Antitrust Liability: What About the
“Reasonable Farmer?,” 22 Drake J. Agric. L. 1, 13 (2017) (discussing agricultural
antitrust litigation in the United States).
150 While price leads antitrust discussion, quality is also a metric that is considered
in antitrust actions. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., THE ROLE AND
MEASUREMENT OF QUALITY IN COMPETITION ANALYSIS 1 (2013). The United
State’s brief for the OECD roundtable quotes the U.S. Supreme Court: “The
antitrust laws do not require manufacturers to produce generic goods that
consumers do not know about or want. The manufacturer strives to improve its
product quality or to promote its brand because it believes this conduct will lead to
increased demand despite higher prices . . . ” Id. at 120 (citing Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897 (2007)).
151 See generally Monica, supra note 94.
152 See discussion supra Section II.B.iii; Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural
and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-18, L642-21 (Fr.); INSTITUT NATIONAL
DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78.
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sign resulting from the work. To accomplish this using a nonprofit
association in the U.S., provisions related to the concept of operators
need to be included. “Operators” can be defined as all persons,
natural and legal, that are involved in any step of product production
that is specifically outlined by the production rules. This means that
a processor that uses a specific process or ingredient outlined in the
production rules would be considered an operator, whereas a
distribution company that simply buys, transports, and sells the
product to retails would not. A bylaw giving operators the right to
have input and voice in the organization should be included, as well
as one providing the right to use the resulting brand if the operator is
in compliance with the specifications.153
Other important fairness aspects of the ODG mode include
representativeness of the operators, democratic functioning, and
balanced representation.154 The first of these, representativeness,
relates to the existing industry for a product. In France, a majority of
the quality signs are related to geographic areas, so that a quality sign
under the PGI or PDO/AOC programs will necessarily implicate the
entire industry in that area.155 This provides significant public policy
justification for the ensuring that the industry is well-represented
during the ODG development process. Other quality products,
including some having Label Rouge status, are not necessarily from
a defined region, but often arose from already existing production
systems. When developing an organization following the ODG mode
in the United States, however, the factor of representativeness may
not be necessary nor desired in many circumstances, such as for the
development of new products, or when a product is intended to be
marketed for its higher quality or special production rules. For
example, a farmer group that wanted to work together to grow a
specific variety of potato such as fingerlings would not need to
involve all of the potato farmers in the state in the development of
their organization. However, for a quality product based on a
geography and its existing reputation, representativeness would be
153

Note that it is not necessarily the case that all operators need to be fee-paying
members in order to enjoy these rights. A provision in French law establishes that
all operators are members, but this may in fact be in opposition to certain EU
public policies as well as impracticable in certain contexts. Code rural et de la
pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-21 (Fr.). See also
Marie-Vivien et al, supra note 105, at 2996.
154 See discussion supra at Section II.B.iii; Code rural et de la pêche maritime
[Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-18 (Fr.); INSTITUT NATIONAL
DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78, at 1.
155
See discussion supra Sections II.B.iii, II.C.i. The structural requirements for
ODGs coupled with the programmatic requirements for the PGI and AOC/PDO
programs result in the potential for inclusion of all operators in the industry in the
delineated region, though participation is voluntary.
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appropriate. Having no overarching institutional structure in the
U.S., these decisions would be made in an ad hoc manner by the
organizers.156
A group can implement the factors of balanced
representation and democratic functioning by creating provisions
related to voting rights and board representation that seek to provide
an appropriate balance of power between the actors involved. The
characteristics of a fair structure will vary based on the circumstances
of the operators and their production. Consideration of the amount of
input by the different categories of actors should be made, for
example, whether most of the work that adds value is done by
farmers, processors, or other relevant actors. Representative equality
can be implemented by providing decision-making weight to the
different categories of actors based on the amounts of production
rules and responsibility that falls on each of them, such as by
allocation of board seats. However, to ascertain this, it is important
for the organizers to create a process for gathering input from all of
the relevant operators involved. Otherwise, operators not sufficiently
included or heard can become disenfranchised, which may lead to
declining quality.
C. Replicating Institutional Supports
Developing a governmental institutional framework similar
to the INAO would likely be extraordinarily costly and politically
infeasible, but many of the strengths of the French institutional
arrangement could feasibly be replicated using private organizations,
and potentially some level of public support. Three main areas of
consideration are development support, quality sign programming,
and defense. Each of these are detailed separately below, although
they also intersect with each other.
i. Development Supports
One of the biggest strengths of the French system is the
existence of INAO agents, who provide some level of assistance
during the development process.157 These agents work with farmers
156

However, if an umbrella brand or oversight program is created to provide
institutional support, representativeness could be instituted as a required factor. See
Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L.
642-6–642-11 (Fr.).
157Interviews conducted with the French international development agency CIRAD
identified this type of expertise as being one of the most desired, potentially
beneficial institutional supports for work in developing countries. See also
Delphine Marie-Vivien & Estelle Biénabe, The Multifaceted Role of the State in
the Protection of Geographical Indications: A Worldwide Review, 98 WORLD DEV.
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in a similar manner as university agricultural extension agents in the
United States, developing expertise in the area of farm business
outreach over their careers. Similarly, there are cooperative
development centers that provide educational outreach, training, and
business development advice in the United States.158 These are often
associated with land grant universities and work in partnership with
university extension agents.
If similar programming around the ODG mode was
developed using these existing land grant resources or via a private
organization, only a handful of agents would be needed to provide
significant outreach, education, and developmental assistance to
groups organizing as ODGs. For example, if a government program
similar to cooperative development programming were to be created,
training could focus with as few staff members as one agent per
business development center, or one extension agent per state.159
Agents with ODG mode expertise could help groups with the
organizational process, ensuring that the right actors are involved and
providing assistance with developing bylaws and production rules.
During the development process, agents could work to ensure the
principles of balanced representation, democratic functioning, and,
where appropriate, representativeness of the extant industry. Agents
could also recommend adoption of the principle that all operators
who comply with the rules are eligible to join the quality sign
organization and use the resulting brand, if that matches the policies
promoted by the agents’ institutions.
ii. Quality Sign Programming
Development of a quality sign program at the state level is
possible in the United States, but funding and other issues may
present significant obstacles that are not feasible to overcome in most
states. However, it is possible that a private organization could be
developed at to create an umbrella brand for groups of producers to
develop products under. While a full assessment of the topic of
1, 1-11 (2017). See Delphine Marie-Vivien & Estelle Biénabe, Institutionalizing
Geographical Indications in Southern Countries: Lessons Learned from Basmati
and Rooibos, 98 WORLD DEV. 58, 58-67 (2017).
158
For examples, the Michigan State University Product Center’s Michigan
Cooperative Development Program; the Mid-America Cooperative Council;
University of Wisconsin’s Center for Cooperatives.
159 On the private side, a relevant example can be found with Cooperative
Development Services, which provides consulting services for food cooperatives
around the United States. They have several experts who travel to conduct
feasibility studies and other food cooperative business development work;
however, these agents have developed a specialized expertise that is indispensable.
See COOP. DEV. SERVS., https://www.cdsus.coop (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
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organizing an umbrella organization is outside the scope of this
study, in this subsection I will visit a few of the key structural aspects
needed to replicate important benefits of the French quality sign
programs.
A quality sign umbrella organization could develop rules to
help shape the ODG-mode organizations and to provide ongoing
oversight. It might be beneficial to create a baseline set of standards,
such as minimum animal welfare and sustainability practices, that
could apply across products.160 The organization could limit the
program to a particular geographical area, such as a region within
Michigan, or a wider foodshed such as the Great Lakes. However,
any umbrella brand organization would need to define what is
different about its products and require groups to define the
specificities of their products. In a practical sense, the success of the
brand might rest on having higher intrinsic levels of quality, in
addition to any other qualities such as geography or being grown with
sustainable practices.
Once the main rules were developed, this umbrella
organization could develop logos and apply for a certification mark
or a collective mark (both marks are types of trademarks) that would
become the basis for a branding program. The organization would
allow ODG-type farmer groups that comply with its rules to use the
resulting logo for branding.
Such an umbrella organization would want to keep its
standards high in order to develop its reputation and establish
credibility. A significant amount of strength and detail of control is
mandated for the French quality sign programs, presumably to ensure
a high level of integrity, and that the signs and products can withstand
scrutiny of policymakers and the consuming public. This justifies the
use of third-party certification organizations. However, the level of
control needed for an umbrella label in the United States could vary.
For some efforts, third-party certification might be prudent to help
provide legitimacy of the brand and program, whereas for others,

160

The Label Rouge program in France has baseline production rules for a variety
of product types, for example, beef, poultry and lamb. Groups seeking the Label
Rouge quality sign must meet these rules at a minimum, and also create their own
specific standards in order to develop a unique product. See generally Label Rouge
[Red Label], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ,
https://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/Official-signs-identifying-quality-and-origin/LabelRouge-Red-Label (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
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such as where consumer trust is high, control checks could be carried
out by the umbrella brand itself.161
Developing financial capital for such an umbrella brand
effort would present a substantial challenge. Due to the large amount
of up-front funding that would be needed to help with the
establishment and organization of the ODG-type production groups,
as well as the resources for the promotion and advertising needed to
successfully develop brand recognition in early years, the
participation of an investment fund could be critical to the feasibility
of the effort. The purpose of developing branding for farmers is not
generally charitable (unless it is tied to another charitable purpose
such as helping underserved communities), and for this reason, the
involvement or creation of a community development financial
institution (CDFI) to create a funding pool may be unlikely to be
successful. Standard venture capital groups are unlikely to work
either, because the venture capitalists will likely want some say in
the programmatic rule development in order to allow flexibility to
adjust to the market. However, this desire would be in direct
opposition to the rigidity of standards needed for long-term brand
development needed. Additionally, venture capitalists will likely
demand relatively high rates of returns to their investment.
However, there are alternatives to CDFIs. One possibility is
to utilize a Benefit Corporation, a burgeoning type of socialentrepreneurship entity, to garner investment from socially conscious
individuals and impact investors who are interested in regional food
system development. These investors may be willing to take a lower
rate of return,162 and a Benefit Corporation can be used to ensure that
the original purposes of the corporation (developing regional
branding for farmers) are adhered to, even if it is less profitable than
other ventures. However, the corporation would have to deal with
securities registration and subsequent advertising of investment
opportunities.

161

Participatory guarantee programs can provide an alternative to conventional
third-party certification; see, for examples, Kornelia Kirchner, Overview of
Participatory Guarantee Systems in 2014, in THE WORLD OF ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS & EMERGING TRENDS 2015 134, 134 (Helga Willer &
Julia Lernoud eds., 2015). Patrick Mundler & Stéphane Bellon, Les Systèmes
Participatifs de Garantie : Une Alternative à la Certification par Organismes
Tiers ? [Participatory Guarantee Systems: An Alternative to Third Party
Certifiation?], 5 POUR 57, 57-65 (2011). Paulo Niederle et al., Social Movements
and Institutional Change in Organic Food Markets: Evidence from Participatory
Guarantee Systems in Brazil and France, 78 J. Rural Stud. 282, 282-291 (2020).
162 See Philip Roundy et al., Finance or Philanthropy? Exploring the Motivations
and Criteria of Impact Investors, 13 SOC. RESP. J. 491, 491-512 (2017).
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If an umbrella organization manages to overcome these
funding and brand development challenges, and eventually gets to
the point where it is running smoothly with numerous member
groups and products, the organization could be used to provide the
expert agents mentioned in the subsection above. Per unit fees have
potential as a sustainable source of funding for those agents and other
operational needs, if the label results in price premiums and increased
sales volumes that make these fees economically feasible to charge
operators. The Label Rouge program, for example, is funded in part
in this manner.163
iii. Defense
ODGs in France enjoy a significant benefit in the form of
government aid for the defense of intellectual property.164 Both the
sending of cease-and-desist letters, and assistance with litigation by
INAO, act as deterrents to domestic and foreign usurpation, and
provide support to ODGs in their defense efforts.
Similar support for intellectual property defense could be
provided to some extent by an umbrella brand organization. An
umbrella organization could centralize defense activities for each of
its groups’ products, writing cease and desist letters, and initiating
the enforcement of US intellectual property laws where necessary.
Template cease and desist letters could be drafted and used for
different circumstances (for one example, local farmer usurpation in
direct markets, in another example infringement of the logo or brand
name by an outside business). If an umbrella organization is
successful financially, per unit fees could be collected from groups
to use for defense of the brand in courts when necessary. Such costs
of litigation and/or mediation could be substantial.
State departments of agriculture (e.g., Michigan Department
of Agriculture and Rural Development) provide another possibility.
A single group or an umbrella organization could negotiate an
arrangement to provide aid with defense efforts. Such a relationship
with a state’s agriculture department could be mutually beneficial,
protecting the reputation of both the quality sign organization and the
state’s agricultural sector, especially if the umbrella organization
uses state or an internal region geography as part of the label. This
would likely require new legislation, which might be more feasible
if it were applicable to other agricultural groups based in the state
(for example, if the Michigan Apple Committee could also request
163

Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritimene Fisheries Code] art.
L642-13 (Fr.).
164
See discussion supra Section II.C.ii.
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state assistance when their label is being infringed upon). Cease and
desist letters written by the state would be a relatively low-cost
method of meeting these mutual goals,165 and in a best-case scenario,
assistance with funding the costs of litigation by the state could be
provided.
IV. Appropriateness of the ODG Mode for Different
Contexts in the United States
The utility of the ODG mode of organization will vary based
on the particular circumstances of a value chain or producer group.
Here we consider the “fit” of the ODG for various contexts in the
United States, and conversely situations where the ODG mode would
likely not be an appropriate fit.
A. More Ideal Contexts for the ODG Mode
The ODG mode has many strengths as an organizational tool
and may be beneficial for groups to use in the right circumstances.
First, as with any value-added food production effort, it is necessary
to have a strong customer base and market for the group’s products,
whether that is achieved through local proximity, shortness of supply
chain, or access to a wide geography using conventional distribution
channels. Additionally, the group of farmers must be amenable to
cooperation. Below is a list of circumstances where the ODG model
would have a more ideal fit:
i. Where groups of farmers want to work in common on
branding a value-added product.
The branding could be intended to develop reputation for a
specific quality of the product (region, variety, growing process), or
could be used for highlighting sustainable practices, or some
combination of these criteria. Take, for example, market gardener
farmers in Southern Michigan, many of whom grow garlic, and use
non-certified organic practices. Working with the assumption that
many of these farmers have the capacity to grow more garlic, an
ODG-mode organization could be formed to create rules and develop
and manage a brand and logo. Farmers could use this label to signal
quality attributes—the chosen variety, sustainable practices, and
geography—to direct market and other types of purchasers. As
consumer awareness of the label grows through, for example, regular
promotion (e.g., posters or flyers) used by members during farmers
165

After the initial development of a template cease and desist letter form, it may
be fair to estimate about two to four hours of MDARD staff time would be needed,
between communication about the issue with the stakeholder group representative
and writing and sending the letter (for a simple matter.)
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markets across the state, demand for the product could also grow,
provided the high quality of the product is maintained.
ii. Where it would be beneficial to have other value chain
actors besides farmers involved (e.g., upstream or
downstream actors).
A strength of the ODG mode is that a variety of value chain
actors can be organized in a manner that is not in opposition to
antitrust laws. In contrast, cooperatives cannot normally have other
value chain actors involved without violating antitrust laws, due in
large part to their commercial nature.166 One example of a product
that would need downstream operators to be involved is Honeycrisp
variety apples from Northwest Michigan, which are known to have a
higher quality due to their coloration, taste, and other factors. In order
to market a fairly uniform, high quality product, a group of farmers
would need to create sizing, coloration, and sucrose content rules for
apples to be sold under the label. Only a small percentage of regional
farmers’ Honeycrisps would make the grade, and the equipment
facilities needed to do the sorting could run into the tens of millions
of dollars in upfront costs. However, many or most apple farmers
already work with packers that have this equipment, and have the
ability to segregate and store apples for marketing over the year. The
Northwest Michigan growers would want to work closely with one
or more of these packers on production standards and management
of ongoing operations.
iii. Where aggregation is required to meet the needs of large
buyers, such as supermarkets and institutions.
Production standard development is conducive to the
aggregation of farmer’s products, because of the resulting
consistency of quality, and the ability to create the sizing and grading
uniformity rules acceptable to supermarkets.167 The ability to
aggregate numerous farmers’ products should enable the distribution
of larger product volumes and sales in wider geographical areas
(statewide, nationally, internationally). Furthermore, the specific set
of standards that is developed can be protected as intellectual
property for purposes of branding and reputation development. This
circumstance could apply to both the garlic and the Northwest
Michigan Honeycrisp groups mentioned above. The Honeycrisp
166

See John C. Monica, Jr., Agricultural Anti-Trust Liability: What About the
“Reasonable Farmer?” 22 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 1-2 (2017).
167 See Getachew Abatekassa & H. Christopher Peterson, Market Access for Local
Food Through the Conventional Food Supply Chain, 14 INT’L FOOD &
AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 41, 41-60 (2011).
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group likely will require a wider distribution than its growing region
to make the effort feasible, so working with larger retailers in the
Great Lakes region could be an ideal fit. The Southern Michigan
garlic group might find that distribution around the state is feasible
and within their aggregate capacity, given a sufficient price premium
or net return.
iv. Where voluntary organizations are preferable to
mandatory organizations (e.g., marketing orders168).
Whereas marketing orders impose requirements and taxes on
all the farmers in a region that are growing a particular product, the
ODG mode could be used to set up an organization that is voluntary
to join.169 The garlic group mentioned above provides an illustrative
example. The subset of garlic growers that are interested in creating
a value-added product could organize without implicating all garlic
growers in the delineated area, as a marketing order would.
Furthermore, to ensure that the opportunity extends to all growers,
ODGs are designed to have open membership for any new producers
168

State and federal marketing orders in the United States impose fees (and rules
in some circumstances) on all of the farmers in the area that grow the particular
product. These are voted in often by a simple majority of producers, sometimes by
slim margins. State marketing orders have oversight by the states (See e.g.,
Michigan, see the Agricultural Commodities Marketing Act, MCL § 290.651-.674
(Westlaw current through P.A. 2021, No. 81, of the Reg. Sess., 101st Legis.)), and
federal marketing orders are overseen by the US Department of Agriculture, who
authority to approve or disapprove actions by the group or board managing the
marketing order. 7 U.S.C.A. § 601. In relation to marketing orders, ODGs may be
more farmer-centric and have less heavy ongoing political and government
involvement once started (for example, members of the Michigan state agricultural
marketing committees are appointed by the governor.)
Antitrust exemptions are made for marketing orders via the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1937, and processors are allowed to be involved (for example,
the tart cherry federal marketing order is voted on by growers but creates duties for
processors). 7 U.S.C.A. § 608(b). As such, one strength of marketing orders is that
quantity control measures can legally be taken by the industry in an attempt to
provide consistency of price, and in some cases such as tart cherries, availability of
product inventory to ensure consistent supply to buyers. However, these quantity
control measures require growers to ‘set aside’ or even dump product on the
ground by law; and strong disagreements can occur within the industry.
ODGs are voluntary; while farmers and other operators are required to
comply with the production rules and often to pay annual fees in order to market
their products using the ODGs quality sign/brand name, farmers are free to sell
their products in other markets, including commodities markets. Furthermore
ODGs can have not only processors, but as many other upstream and downstream
value chain actors as is practicable.
169 This applies generally to development in the U.S., and to certain quality sign
ODGs in France. However, while with PGI and PDO/AOC groups membership is
not mandatory, farmers in the region cannot legally use the regional brand
developed without following the specifications and joining the ODG.
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willing to follow the production rules. The result is that the voluntary
aspect of ODGs does not lead to an exclusive closed club.
v. Where fairness and equity between value chain actors is a
need.
Fairness is an integral part of the French ODG model, due to
specific requirements for a balance of power between actors in an
ODG, and to an underlying focus on fairness in contracts under
French law. As detailed in Section II above, these aspects could be
infused into an ODG-mode organization in the United States using
specific provisions in organizational documents and/or, if necessary,
by creating oversight mechanisms (although these oversight
mechanisms might have a significant cost). Take, for example, a
product such as a type of cheese organized by Michigan milk
producers, which is produced for larger-scale distribution in the
Great Lakes region. Processors and/or transformers would need to
be involved to process the milk, create, shape, and ripen the cheese,
and then package it for distribution. Given that processors are often
very concentrated in the dairy industry, farmers could use an ODG
to both involve the downstream actors, and protect their decisionmaking voice and power within the organization.
B. Less Ideal Contexts for the ODG Mode
As with any mode or entity, the ODG mode would not be an
ideal fit with every circumstance, and does not promise to be a
panacea. Below are a few circumstances where the ODG mode
should clearly be avoided:
1. The ODG mode would not work well for marketing a large
number of individual products, because it would be difficult to create
production standards for each product. An example would be a
multiple-farm CSA collaboration for grouping numerous market
garden products, whether through seasonal subscription or through a
common online ordering system—instead, a cooperative or LLC
would likely be better fit. However, a strong umbrella brand for
market garden products could facilitate the creation of production
standards for a large number of products over time.
2. The ODG mode would not be a good fit for the
conventional version of commodity products such as corn, soybeans,
or oranges. The ODG mode is mainly applicable to value-added
products, because the production rules are intended to provide
something different or additional in comparison to the commodity
version of the product, such as varietal or regional qualities.
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3. The ODG mode would not be a good fit for products that
have a large variability in size, appearance, or variety, if the intent is
to aggregate for larger-scope wholesale markets, such as
supermarkets. This is because supermarkets normally require a
significant amount of uniformity.170 For example, if a group of
farmers wants to work together to market a certain variety of peach,
but there is great variability between size and color of peaches from
each of the different farmers, an ODG mode would be less
appropriate.
V. Conclusion
French ODGs provide one model for regionally-based food
product organization. Geographical indications have been
comprehensively studied as an intellectual property umbrella that
farmers can gather under, boasting well-known products from France
and around the world.171 However, less is known about the nature of
the collective management organizations underlying those products.
This research investigated the legal underpinnings as well as
institutional supports that affect the structure of these collectively
managed entities in France. France’s statutory and regulatory
regimes for ODGs have unique attributes and strengths, including a
focus on fairness and balance in structure, and an ability to include
not only farmers, but also packers, processors, cheese ripeners, and
other value chain actors.172 Each of the relevant actors for a particular
product can potentially be involved in determining the product rules
that will apply to them.
Many of the strengths found in the French context can indeed
be translated to the context of the United States. Some aspects of
ODGs are relatively simple to replicate, given the relatively similar
state background institutions, legal systems,173 and property rights
enforcement (rule of law). Other aspects of ODGs are more difficult
170

Jennifer Jo Thompson & Julia Gaskin, An Extension Specialist's Reflections
from the Field: Discovering Ag of the Middle in the Shift from Direct Sale to
Wholesale Vegetable Production, 40 CULTURE, AGRIC., FOOD & ENV’T, 124, 124,
127 (2018).
171 See, e.g., Barham, supra note 19, at 127-30; Ulrike Grote, Environmental
Labeling, Protected Geographical Indications and the Interests of Developing
Countries, 10 ETSEY CENTRE J. INT’L L. & TRADE Pol’y 94, 96100 (2009); William Van Caenegem et al., Pride and Profit: Geographical
Indications as Regional Development Tools in Australia, 16 J. ECON. & SOC. POL’Y
1, 1, 7-10 (2014).
172 See discussion supra Section II.B.iii; Code R rural et de la pêche maritime
[Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-3, L642-21.
173 While France has a civil law system as opposed to the common law system
used in the United States, contract, corporate, and commercial law are quite similar
in each country.
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to replicate due to their connection with unique institutions in France
and the EU that are dedicated to quality sign products. Replicating
these would therefore require the creation of oversight bodies for
particular aspects, and development and funding of outreach experts
for others. However, the benefits of these efforts could potentially
outweigh the costs, if enough participation and volume were
achieved.
A promising area of future research would be to investigate
to what extent and how the strengths of ODGs could be replicated in
other contexts that have weaker, or significantly different,
government institutional support. In particular, it may be valuable to
determine if the aspects of balanced representation and democratic
functioning can effectively be replicated in order to provide farmer
groups with more negotiating power vis-à-vis concentrated value
chain actors such as processors.

